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The Issue
Corruption is a complex phenomenon and in many cases is the conse-
quence of more deep-seated problems of policy distortion, institutional
incentives, and governance. Therefore, it cannot be addressed by simple
legal acts proscribing corruption. In virtually all countries, local laws for-
bid corrupt behavior. Yet, in more cases than is readily admitted, effective
efforts to combat corruption have been limited. In many developing and
transition economies, the judiciary, legal enforcement institutions, police,
and other legal bodies are unreliable because the rule of law is often fragile
and therefore can be captured by corrupt interests.
But corruption is not limited to these economies. In developed coun-
tries, tax incentives, standards of conduct, and general attitudes often lend
themselves to providing the resources for corruption. Indeed, "the abuse of
public office for private gain," as corruption is generally defined, takes
place in both rich and poor countries and must be tackled as much in the
places where payments originate as where they are received.
To assist governments, the business community, and other interested
parties debate the issue, Transparency International (TI) has been publish-
ing an increasingly comprehensive Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI).
This index is a "poll of polls" drawing upon numerous distinct surveys of
expert and general public views of the extent of corruption in countries
around the world. Recent data show that the bulk of countries have poor
scores, strongly suggesting that corruption is a serious issue that deserves
much higher attention in the policy agenda of this region. TI has also
started to publish a Bribe Payers Index (BPI) ranking leading exporting
countries and industries in terms of the degree their companies are per-
ceived to be paying bribes abroad.' Indeed, where there is a recipient, there
is a payer, and, strictly speaking, the spotlight and the issue needs to be
focused at both ends-the supply and the demand side of corruption.
Implications
In the final analysis, corruption is as much a moral as a development issue.
It can distort entire decision-making processes on investment projects and
other commercial transactions and corrupt the very social fabric of socie-
ties. Statistical evidence illustrates that higher corruption is associated
with: "(i) higher [and more costly] public investment; (ii) lower govern-
* Executive Director, Transparency International.
1. For details on the CPI and BPI, see Transparency Int'l, Transparency International
(visited Nov. 29, 2000) <www.transparency.org>.
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ment revenues; (iii) lower expenditures on operations and maintenance;
and (iv) lower quality of public infrastructure."'2 The evidence also shows
that corruption increases public investment by making it more expensive
while reducing its productivity-not to mention the loss of resources to the
countries resulting from uneconomic investments.3
By the same token, corruption affects not only the size but the compo-
sition and associated quality of public investment programs. Corrupt
administrations tend to spend less on education and other social expendi-
tures because expensive infrastructure outlays crowd out spending on edu-
cation and other social investments. 4 This suggests that corruption tends
to mortgage future generations, -since long-term economic growth is
directly related to educational attainment.
The secondary effects of policy distortions can be equally staggering.
For instance, a survey undertaken by the World Bank in petroleum pro-
curement and distribution in sub-Saharan Africa five years ago showed that
existing practices 'generated resource outflows in excess of $1.5 billion-
significantly more than yearly net disbursements of World Bank loans and
credits to the region.5 This is particularly serious because the efforts to
generate savings and surpluses fall far short of the investment require-
ments for that continent.
The fact that corruption lowers economic growth implies that econo-
mists should be more restrained in their praise of high public sector invest-
ment and stress the importance of greater attention to corruption as well as
the quality and composition of public expenditures. The issue of corrup-
tion, and its effects on efficient and effective resource use, needs a much
higher place in the policy debate.
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, most countries in Latin America
adopted structural adjustment, economic liberalization, and "moderniza-
tion" policies, aimed at coping with and preventing economic crises by
developing building blocks to improve the agility and effectiveness of pub-
lic sector management. A mixed reform record, however, has brought
about recognition that the problems are more fundamental than originally
thought and that a "second generation" of reform is needed.
In light of the growing recognition of complexities in the reform pro-
cess, an increasing number of countries are beginning to tackle broader
and deeper institutional issues, such as decentralization and sub-national
government reform, judicial reform, and anti-corruption efforts. Some
countries are going beyond these issues and are tackling issues such as
"voice" and participation, "exit" and competition, and restructuring
2. VITO TANZI & HAMID DAVAODI, CORRUPTION, PUBLIC INVESTMENT, AND GROWTH 1
(International Monetary Fund Working Paper 97/139, 1997).
3. See Daniel Kaufmann, Corruption: The Facts, FOREIGN POL'Y, Summer 1997, at
114, 117-20.
4. See Paolo Mauro, Corruption: Causes, Consequences, and Agenda for Further
Research, FIN. & DEv., Mar. 1998, at 11, 12.
5. See Miguel Schloss, Does Petroleum Procurement and Trade Matter?: The Case of
sub-Saharan Africa, FIN. & DEv., Mar. 1993, at 44, 44.
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enforcement mechanisms for internal rules and regulations. Work in these
new areas requires stronger, broader, and deeper commitments to sustaina-
ble implementation.
The Roots of Corruption & Corrective Action
Clearly, a more comprehensive approach is needed rather than the popular
road of issuing declarations, policy statements, or even legislation. More
importantly, to ensure better results, a greater focus is needed on the
underlying causes of corruption and on mutually supporting mechanisms
between governments, business practices in the private sector, and civil
society.
In this regard, it should be understood that bribery encompasses
payoffs for a wide variety of illicit activities: (i) getting around licenses,
permits, and signatures; (ii) acquiring monopolistic power through entry
barriers to competitors; (iii) access to public goods, including legal or
uneconomic awards of public procurement contracts; (iv) access to the use
of public physical assets or their outright stripping and appropriation; (v)
access to preferential financial assets, such as credit; (vi) illegal trade in
goods banned for security and health considerations, such as drugs and
nuclear materials; (vii) illicit financial transactions, such as money laun-
dering and insider trading; (viii) influencing administrative or legislative
actions; and (ix) influencing judicial decisions. In all these cases, corrup-
tion occurs when economic opportunities for it prevail and political will to
combat it is lacking. In a way, corruption is a symptom of fundamental
economic and political problems. Addressing these problems effectively
requires dealing with the underlying economic, political, and institutional
causes.
At the root of many of the problems, one can find excessive discretion-
ary powers. It stands to reason that the higher the professional levels in
civil service, the lower the perceived levels of corruption. Quite apart from
the wastefulness of corruption expenditures and associated misallocation
of resources, valuable management time gets siphoned off through time
spent with public officials.
As a result, efforts to reduce opportunities for discretion are often an
important element for PREVENTION. These efforts typically include liberali-
zation policies such as reductions of trade restrictions, subsidies, price
controls, and directed credit that have been undertaken in a growing num-
ber of countries in Latin America.
Similarly, on the ENFORCEMENT side, weak institutions often require the
help of independent oversight commissions with powers to investigate and,
at times, prosecute or adjudicate, as has been instituted in Chile, Hong
Kong, Singapore, and Botswana. More generally, and not surprisingly, cor-
ruption perceptions tend to be higher, the weaker the rule of law in the
countries concerned.
Finally, proper INTERFACE needs to be formed between civil society, the
private sector, and governments to help assess the issues and develop sup-
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port for combating corruption and to develop more effective ways of doing
business. More than any other field, corruption is not an area that lends
itself to technocratic solutions developed by a few and executed by many;
long-term and sustainable development requires a real commitment from
all concerned and often needs home-grown and tailor-made solutions.
More broadly, a combination of actions on prevention, enforcement,
and support from the local community could help in overcoming these
problems. Many corrective actions are associated with deregulation and
depolitization of economic activities, generation of information and data
for greater transparency and associated accountability, build-up of appro-
priate legal institutions or set-up of parallel ones-or self-regulating bodies
where this is not possible, and development of coalitions to promote coher-
ent actions among different players in a society.
In the end, though, any effort will require a diagnosis of the specific
problems, an ensuing prioritization and sequencing of interventions, and a
monitoring of impact. Whatever course is taken, experience suggests that
focus should be on a minimum, critical mass of interventions-a few initial
examples-to get some early gains for later replication.
The Response
Aware of these developments, donors, nongovernmental organizations, gov-
ernments, businesses, and citizens in developing and industrial countries
are increasingly concerned about corruption. Fortunately, the opportuni-
ties to address corruption are greater than they have ever been. New global
standards of behavior are emerging, driven partly by changing attitudes
toward transnational bribery in industrial countries and partly by height-
ened awareness of the costs of corruption in developing countries.
GOVERNMENTS. Quite apart from economic and public sector reforms,
a number of initiatives taken at the international level will have construc-
tive repercussions in many countries.
" Twenty-five countries signed the landmark Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption in March 1996, two years after the issue of corrup-
tion was put on the Summit of the Americas agenda by the leaders of the
Western Hemisphere. The Convention requires countries to criminalize
transnational bribery and all illicit enrichment. Other provisions
include building commitments to provide greater mutual assistance and
to establish a framework for cooperation on extradition. In addition, the
Convention encourages countries to adopt a wide range of laws and reg-
ulations to prevent corruption. These measures include: conflict of
interest rules, disclosure of assets by high public officials and their fami-
lies, establishment of national organizations for the oversight of such
laws, protection for whistleblowers, and open government procurement.
" Similarly, in late 1997, thirty-four countries signed the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on Brib-
ery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions.
The purpose of the Convention is to criminalize corruption of foreign
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officials and end the tax deductibility of bribes, thereby removing the
associated fiscal incentives. This historic first step provides a sound,
though limited, framework for an international anti-bribery system. The
convention was presented to national legislators for implementation dur-
ing 1998, with a target date at the end of 1998 for entry into force.
Multilateral development banks have begun to play a role in their respec-
tive areas of expertise and responsibility. The International Monetary
Fund has started to restrict its operations in countries where the level of
corruption is deemed to negatively affect their economic performance.
The World Bank has initiated a more comprehensive program. First, it
introduced sanctions on firms and governments engaged in corrupt
practices. Under this arrangement, the World Bank would ban firms
that offer bribes from future Bank-financed procurement worldwide. It
would also cancel loans to governments whose officials solicited bribes.
Second, the World Bank modified its procurement procedures to accom-
modate countries that seek to include a "no bribery pledge" in major
international public procurement projects financed by the Bank. Lastly,
the World Bank reoriented its disbursement procedures to strengthen
borrower accountability for sound procurement and financial
management.
While these are undoubtedly important steps, their proper implemen-
tation is key to delivering on the promise of accountable governments and
hospitable business environments. Governments lack a common frame-
work to harmonize anti-corruption efforts throughout their region. How-
ever, nothing prevents countries from developing their own action without
a common framework in their region. After all, effective action in the fight
against corruption will require more than imprisoning people.
On the multilateral development institutions' front, action is being
taken. The Inter-American Development Bank has started to tighten pro-
curement guidelines and enhance support for public sector reform pro-
grams. In the future, other organizations, such as the World Trade
Organization, should review and reform their programs to more forcefully
combat corruption. Furthermore, the World Bank needs to strengthen its
working arrangements with relevant civil society institutions.and sharpen
its country assistance strategies by mainstreaming anti-corruption efforts
in its policy, public sector reform, projects, and other lending, as well as its
economic and private sector work.
PRIVATE SECTOR. There are differences of opinion about the value of
corporate anti-corruption programs and associated codes of conduct.
Many in the business community believe that self-regulation is the right
solution and that it is preferable to government regulation. Others argue
that self-regulation is a sham and only government action can be expected
to curb corruption. When seen as a component of a comprehensive anti-
corruption program, however, corporate anti-corruption programs could
provide a stimulus for more business-like and effective economic activity.
They are not a substitute for government regulations; both are needed and
each reinforces the other.
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A "best practices" study of anti-corruption programs used by major
American companies6 stressed that whether a code of conduct is only a
piece of paper or it controls corporate behavior depends on the company's
compliance program. Unequivocal commitment by top management is
essential. Among the key elements of such codes, the study highlighted:
* A clear policy statement that the company prohibits employees and third
parties representing the company from offering anything of value,
directly or indirectly, to a government official to influence or reward an
action.
* Detailed guidelines regarding gifts, entertainment, and travel expenses,
and strict compliance with applicable laws and regulations regarding
corporate political contributions and their disclosure.
* A system of internal controls and record keeping that ensures that com-
pany books accurately reflect its transactions, overseen by an audit com-
mittee composed of outside directors and associated internal reporting.
The key in evaluating the role of corporate anti-bribery codes is their
interplay with government programs. The effectiveness of corporate codes
is enhanced by governmental measures. Similarly, corporate codes rein-
force the effectiveness of government anti-bribery programs. The main ele-
ments to build this synergy are:
* Criminal law. Managers tend to be concerned about their personal
exposure to large fines and prison terms, which reduces extortion by
local or foreign officials by making refusals to pay credible. The synergy
between government enforcement and corporate compliance programs
is further enhanced by the U.S. Justice Department's sentencing guide-
lines. These provide more lenient treatment for companies that conduct
proper compliance programs, which is a strong incentive for companies
to establish compliance programs and usually include auditing and
monitoring arrangements, enforcement of disciplinary mechanisms, and
appropriate responses and due diligence after detection. Several Euro-
pean countries, Australia, and Canada have or are in the process of
adopting similar legislation.
* Tax treatment. When the tax laws treat bribes as tax-deductible, the
message is that foreign bribes are a legitimate business expense-if not a
subsidized activity. Denying tax deductibility for bribes requires corpo-
rations to distinguish between proper and improper business expenses,
which means relevant corporate managers would be carefully scruti-
nized, as they could expose corporations to liability for tax fraud.
CIVIL Socr'mr. A growing number of structures, institutions, and
associations-outside of state apparatus and profit-making businesses-are
evolving for the joint and proactive pursuit of shared interests. Chambers
of commerce, professional and religious associations, and various forms of
non-governmental organizations are becoming players, shaping opinions,
6. Transparency Int'l-USA, Corporate Anti-Corruption Programs: A Survey of Best
Practices (June 1996) <http://www.transparency-usa.org/survey.96.htm>.
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building coalitions, providing testimonies, and monitoring government
and enterprises.
What legitimates civil society organizations is a concern about issues
that are not adequately represented in the normal political process and a
focus on problems that often go beyond the limited reach or capabilities of
the nation-state, where market forces are unlikely to produce desired
results. Moreover, the rules of civil society organizations do not arise out
of self-interest or profit-orientation, but from genuine commitment to the
public interest in a specific area, such as corruption.
Civil societies are the stakeholders and the parties ultimately affected
by corruption. They must be engaged constructively to get their support
for the necessary reforms. Only in this way can the necessary policy and
institutional changes become viable and sustainable. Countries that have
been hospitable and supportive of civil society bodies-through hearing
arrangements in their regulatory and legislative procedures and involving
them in oversight institutions-have enabled the organic and internally
driven evolution of policies and institutions.
It is argued that if civil society gets involved as a partner and its efforts
at monitoring the state are encouraged, this would contribute to the even-
tual elimination of corruption. The issue of partnership, however, is a
complex one. Governments, multilateral development institutions, and pri-
vate sector institutions are for the most part established and strong. Most
civil societies are new and weak. The former have decision-making proce-
dures and clear lines of communications; civil society has none of these.
Governments and private companies have authorities to please and sched-
ules to follow; civil societies have nothing of the sort, yet must respond
organically to people's concerns. For the most part, there is a mismatch
between civil society's capacity to act and the functions performed by the
government and private sector.
That being said, a number of regions have made positive strides in key
areas. In the United States, the United Kingdom, and many western
democracies, there is a long record of transparency in decision-making and
involvement of civil society; generally, the more pluralistic the societies, the
lower the levels of corruption. Also in a growing number of countries,
especially in Latin America, aside from the structural reforms under way,
there are expanding civil societies, which engage in a growing number of
strategic activities.
Leveling the Playing Field: The Role of Transparency International
Where the interface between civil society and the government and private
sector is poor, there is a tendency to "crowd out" the economy into the
informal sector and with it the levels of corruption. For this reason, Trans-
parency International facilitates the interaction between different groups,
particularly civil society with governments and the private sector.
Since effective action can only be sustained through the presence of
institutions that catalyze the various interest groups in a non-partisan man-
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ner, TI has been established as a not-for-profit and non-governmental
organization to counter corruption in international business transactions.
Over the years, it has fostered National Chapters to build alliances,
enhance awareness, create support for actions to combat corruption, help
overcome the resistance of those with a stake in the status quo, mobilize
people and expertise behind meaningful action, and, in the end, improve
the interface between governments, businesses, and civil society for effec-
tive governance.
If experience elsewhere is to serve as a guide for effective anti-corrup-
tion efforts, then a purely technocratic approach will not be feasible or
sustainable. Thus, the process of reaching corrective actions will be as
important as their content. Indeed, in this field, more than anywhere else,
the wide ramifications of change can only take place as the result of a dia-
logue that is internally driven-in each country, in each situation. Only
home-grown strategies developed in full partnership with civil society have
any chance of success. Therefore, technical assistance and other efforts
usually provided by the donor community have to move from the industry
standard "best practice" to "good fit," tailor-made solutions-designed to
meet local institutional and cultural concerns. It is for each society to find
answers to its own challenges. Others can assist by presenting options and
practices and inform the process from which local anti-corruption coali-
tions-the primary actors-must find and forge their own solutions and
associated strategies for reform.
To this end, TI's mission is to:
* Curb corruption through international and national coalitions that
encourage governments to establish and implement effective laws, poli-
cies, and anti-corruption programs.
* Strengthen public support and understanding for anti-corruption pro-
grams and enhance public transparency and accountability in interna-
tional business transactions and the administration of public
procurement.
* Encourage all parties to international business transactions to operate at
the highest levels of integrity, guided in particular by TI's Standards of
Conduct.
TI's strategy is to complete its mission by:
* Establishing coalitions of like-minded organizations and individuals to
work with governments-wherever possible-to assist in developing and
implementing national anti-corruption programs.
* Initiating an information center and conducting practically-oriented
research into containing corruption; participating in public fora; and
broadening public awareness of the damage caused by corruption, the
need to counter it, and the means to reduce it.
* Building National Chapters of TI that foster anti-corruption programs in
their own countries in accordance with TI's approaches and core values
and that help secure support for TI's international program of action.
Over the years, TI has become well-known as a focus for efforts to
reduce international corruption. It is evolving as a catalyst for govern-
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ments looking for assistance in areas directly related to this subject, from
investigation to book-keeping and from law drafting to law enforcement.
Aside from the support for monitoring of the international agree-
ments, TI has been supporting studies and research and providing special-
ist advice to governments and other interested parties. Its current efforts
focus on establishing "Special Integrity Programs," which generally start
with workshops aimed at diagnosing sources of corruption and identifying
corrective plans of actions, followed by the implementation and monitoring
of those plans. Initial experiences in this direction are illustrated in the
following examples:
" In Argentina, the province of Mendoza, the local chapter of TI has been
working with government support on the Island of Integrity Approach,
whereby the regional authorities and enterprises interested in bidding
for public works agreed to follow tender practices and contractual
arrangements in a public tendering process. This action, together with
the collection and monitoring of selected public procurement costs,
reaped significant pay-offs because the costs of some public services in
Mendoza became cheaper than in other parts of the country, which led
to pressures to reduce costs elsewhere.
" In Panama, the local TI chapter has been invited to monitor the privatiza-
tion process in a number of sectors and has been involved in the process
of privatizing the Panamanian telephone company, Intel SA.
" More broadly, TI published the National Integrity Systems: The TI Source
Book,7 which brings together a wide variety of experience in building
integrity systems to contain corruption, and a companion volume, which
assembles a wide variety of instruments used to monitor assets, set stan-
dards, and enforce effective laws.
Given these and other experiences, Transparency International and
the World Bank have been working with a small number of countries, help-
ing them diagnose corruption problems, build consensus for reforms, and
introduce anti-corruption measures. Noteworthy has been the work of the
Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, which, in partnership
with TI, has conducted "national integrity workshops" and conducted
training for economic journalists and parliamentarians in an increasing
number of countries. Also, work is now underway to support the estab-
lishment of Anti-Corruption Undertakings and Integrity Pacts to give oper-
ational context to selected projects.8 Finally, an effort is being mounted
with TI support to strengthen National Chapters and the network among
them to enhance their capacities and effectiveness.
7. TRANsPARENcY INr'L, THE TI SOURCE BOOK (Jeremy Pope ed., 2d ed. 1997), availa-
ble at Transparency Int'l, The TI Source Book (last modified Sept. 18, 1996) <http:II
www.transparency.de/documents/source-book/index.html>.
8. See, e.g., Transparency Int'l, The Integrity Pact (TI-IP): The Concept, the Model and
the Present Applications: A Status Report as of November 1, 1999 (Nov. 6, 1999) <http://
www.transparency.de/activities/ip.status-report.html>.
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Conclusions
In sorting out the issues and their solutions, it is difficult not to sound
trite. That being said, there are five broad observations to be made:
First: Corruption is a highly sensitive issue. There is nothing right
about it. It is wrong in principle, wrong in practice, and wrong wherever
and whenever it occurs. But as we are all painfully aware, we are a long
way from a transparent, level playing field. Different organizations and dif-
ferent countries draw different lines in the sand in different places. But the
deeper truth is that legitimate investment and corruption do not mix. Cor-
ruption destroys billions of scarce dollars every year; it is the dry rot under-
mining aid. It distorts development, it frightens away genuine foreign
investors, and it perverts societies.
Second: Living in an age of vanishing political borders, rapidly coalesc-
ing transnational global culture, and growing economic integration, an iso-
lated existence is no longer a viable option-at least not without a
prohibitive cost in economic development. International standards, such
as those being adopted by major enterprises, international conventions
such as those adopted by the OECD and the Americas, and guidelines
adopted by international lending institutions are becoming an integral part
of the global scene of increased transparency and growing concern about
corruption. No country is immune to these global threats. It is thus
incumbent upon all countries and institutions to deal with these issues;
world economic development will bypass those who prefer to remain on
the old course. Technological changes, growing information flows, and
attendant increases in competition are increasingly forcing businesses to
provide superior goods and services at competitive prices. Bribes may
"sell" obsolete and high-priced goods but at the cost of losing competitive
edge. In the end, success will only come to those able to develop knowl-
edge in every field of their business, to innovate for superior performance.
Third: Corruption is a problem that all countries have to confront.
Solutions, however, can only be home-grown. Fighting corruption is thus
the business of everyone-governments, private sector, and civil society.
An alliance between all of them is a true test of a country's commitment to
the elimination of corruption.
Fourth: Corruption also impacts corporate performance. It corrodes
the reputation of multinational companies and adds to shareholder risk.
Worst of all, it can ultimately lead to serious social unrest. The legitimacy
of enterprises and their long-term viability rest on how they deal with this
issue. Accordingly, no business that wants to succeed can be passive in the
face of change; passivity is the route to competitive failure. In this regard,
modern business is a dynamic force, one that has always offered new
choice and new approaches in response to the evolving needs of societies.
It is increasingly unlikely that any business can ignore the views of its cus-
tomers, its shareholders, and society-at-large. As companies improve cor-
porate governance, adopt codes of conduct, and respond to emerging
legislation, they should not stop at compliance. The aim increasingly is to
encourage openness and learning in the company. Progressive and suc-
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cessful enterprises welcome public scrutiny. The key is transparency and
accountability; success is rooted in being better, not just good.
Fifth: To their dismay, governments have found in recent years that
secretive decision-making by small elites can no longer be sustained. Con-
trary to the claim, often made by central banks, government officials, and
even some in international organizations, that decision-making on techni-
cal or complex subjects is best left to experts without participation by
those affected, policy decisions that fail to take into account important
information and interests will lack the legitimacy that only public voice
can sustain. Transparency plays many beneficial roles in both market and
governance. All indications are that it increases the efficiency of markets
and may reduce the likelihood of financial crises. In governance, trans-
parency is logically necessary for accountability; such accountability is the
political equivalent of the efficiency generated between firms. Since politi-
cal authorities are monopolies, "competition" occurs between ideas and
use of resources, rather then organizations.
But a culture of transparency will not come solely as the result of hec-
toring or even conditionality applied by the international financial institu-
tions. It requires thinking beyond the disclosure standards that are being
so widely discussed to question the incentives facing public sector
activities.
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Appendix: Anatomy of Anti-corruption Programs
Below is a wide but not exhaustive list of steps that might be part of an
anti-corruption program. Not all steps are appropriate in every setting. It is
essential to diagnose an individual setting, consider proposed solutions
carefully, and work closely with allies in the government and other part-
ners to coordinate strategies and identify individual activities that comple-
ment each other.
A. Prevention
Economic reform
" liberalization and deregulation where possible; a smaller more efficient
government
" privatization of parastatals in competitive sectors
" a new look at tax and regulatory policy to match policies to enforcement
capabilities
" opening trade regimes to create "competition" and pressure for reform
Administrative Reform
* preparation of proper "checks and balances" in the public sector
* establishment of "competing bureaucracies"-either horizontally, within
one level of government, or vertically, among different levels of govern-
ment-to deliver similar services where possible
* assignment of responsibilities, including devolution to sub-national gov-
ernments, with institutional capacity in mind
* identification and support of "pockets of excellence"
Civil Service Reform
" move toward merit-based processes in civil service recruitment, perform-
ance evaluation, promotion, and termination
" establishment of reasonable salary levels and gradation
Budget Reform and Financial Management
" review and audit of government procurement practices
" service delivery surveys, as an audit device for budget execution
" bypassing of government agencies: direct donor funding of community-
level service, delivery projects, or private infrastructure projects
" accounting, disclosure, and auditing standards for public and private
sector institutions
" prudential regulations, bankruptcy arrangements, and other oversight
mechanisms for financial intermediation
Reform in Tax and Customs Organization
* functional organization of departments
* establishment of benchmarks for performance
increasing data availability and transparency
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* strengthening of taxpayer appeals mechanisms, both internal and exter-
nal to the revenue departments
B. Enforcement
Procurement
* inclusion of "no-bribery-pledge" in bidding documents
* encouraging alternative legal institutions for settlement of disputes
Legal and Judicial Reform
" review of anti-corruption and conflict-of-interest legislation to ensure
adequacy
" steps towards heightened independence of the judiciary
" strengthening incentives for and building skills of public prosecutors
" review of administrative law to strengthen transparency of and public
input to rulemaking
" set-up of a special anti-corruption agency
" disclosure of higher-level civil servants' and politicians' income or tax
return
C. Interfacing
Societal Support Action
" awareness raising and collaborative problem-identification through
workshops
" generating and disseminating information and data
" review of libel legislation to strengthen the watchdog role of the press
" journalist training and support
" identification and support of "local champions," including NGOs
" collective action by international and domestic institutions, involving
political leadership, business communities, financial institutions, and
NGOs
Political Process
" review of campaign finance laws
" support for political party formation and voice
" support for constitutional reform to strengthen civil liberties
Self-Regulating Arrangements
* issuance of codes of conduct for enterprises
* establishment of review boards or oversight committee
sentencing guidelines reflecting enterprises' self-corrective behavior

